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Providing access towards raw data is often considered to be a good solution for improving human 
decision making in interaction with imperfect automated decision support such as alarm systems. 
However, there is some evidence that such cross-checking measures are used in an asymmetric 
manner with respect to the amount of uncertainty involved in the decision. Namely, people seem 
to accept low amounts of uncertainty when complying with an alarm cue, but not when 
contradicting it. The current study investigates the question whether this phenomenon is limited 
to alarm systems and a high risk environment. Within a multi-task PC simulation participants 
performed a low risk monitoring task which was supported by a system neutrally framed as 
“assistant system”. In one group the cues emitted by the system were 90% correct, in the other 
10% were correct, thus causing a 10% uncertainty about the real state in both conditions. Results 
show a strong asymmetry as participants in the latter condition spent a high amount of effort in 
reducing their uncertainty, while participants in the former condition did not. Furthermore 
participants’ behavior almost exactly replicates the asymmetric cross-checking pattern found in a 
former study which employed a comparatively high risk monitoring task supported by an “alarm 
system”. This supports the hypothesis that the observed commission bias represents a general 
phenomenon in the context of automated decision support, irrespective of the risk attributed to the 
environment and irrespective of whether the system represents an alarm system or not. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Although automations such as decision support 
systems usually work according to clearly defined 
decision-criteria (e.g. specific thresholds in case of alarm 
systems), humans do not, at least not necessarily. In fact 
decision research has proven that humans show a variety 
of decision biases. That is the case particularly when 
uncertainty is involved in the decision situation, a setting 
which is also found in the interaction with decision 
support systems. Among the probably most prominent 
examples are alarm systems. On the one hand they 
provide indispensable decision-support in typical 
supervisory control tasks. On the other hand, however, 
they never provide perfectly reliable information but 
emit a certain number of false alarms and/or misses, 
depending on the specific design of their signal-
detection characteristics. This usually leaves the user 
with some degrees of uncertainty about the validity of a 
given alarm cue. In case that operators have no 
possibilities to double-check a given alarm’s validity 
towards other available data they usually rely on some 
sorts of response selection heuristic which have been 
referred to as extreme responding or probability 
matching (e.g. Bliss, 2003; Bliss, Gilson, & Deaton, 
1995). However even more interesting is the case when 
operators have the possibility to verify a given alarm 
towards other data. This way they may effectively 
reduce the level of uncertainty before making their 
decision whether or not to follow an alarm. 
Nevertheless, it is yet not well understood how people 
deal with such opportunities to reduce uncertainty. 
Gérard and Manzey (2010) followed the straight-
forward hypothesis that double-checking behavior would 
directly depend on the level of uncertainty. They 
assumed that people would not check raw data if 
uncertainty is low, but make use of double-checking 
when uncertainty is high. In their study the level of 
uncertainty was manipulated by varying the PPV 
(positive predictive value) of an alarm within a range of 
.1 (10% of alarms correct) to .9 (90% of alarms correct) 
between groups. Note that the extreme PPVs – in this 
case .1 and .9 – cause the lowest levels of uncertainty 
while the medium PPV of .5 causes maximum 
uncertainty. Specifically, when a PPV=.1 alarm occurs it 
is 90% certain, that there actually is no critical event. 
Hence there is a 10% error risk if not double-checking 
such an alarm but ignoring it altogether. When a PPV=.9 
alarm occurs, it is 90% certain that there really is a 
critical event. Therefore there is a similar 10% error risk 
if not double-checking such an alarm but directly 
following it. In case of a PPV=.5 alarm uncertainty is at 
a maximum of 50% and so would be the error risk 
without double-checking. Accordingly, Gérard and 
Manzey assumed that the checking rate would relate to 
PPV in an inverted u-shape. Interestingly, participants’ 
decision behavior at the same time supports and 
contradicts this uncertainty hypothesis. In accordance to 
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 2
01
3 
by
 H
um
an
 F
ac
to
rs
 a
nd
 E
rg
on
om
ic
s 
S
oc
ie
ty
, I
nc
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
. D
O
I 1
0.
11
77
/1
54
19
31
21
35
71
30
1
PROCEEDINGS of the HUMAN FACTORS and ERGONOMICS SOCIETY 57th ANNUAL MEETING - 2013 1362
the hypothesis participants double-checked most of the 
PPV=.5 alarms and rarely checked PPV=.9 alarms. In 
contrast to the assumptions however checking rates for 
the PPV=.1 alarm were as high as for the PPV=.5 alarm. 
So while participants most of the time accepted the 10% 
uncertainty in the PPV=.9 case without looking at the 
raw data they did not accept the 10% uncertainty in the 
PPV=.1 case. In the latter case they spend a high amount 
of effort in checking the raw data, thereby compromising 
their overall monetary outcome as supervising the alarm 
system was only part of their multi-task mission. It has 
to be noted that objective costs of false alarms and 
misses do not account for this asymmetry as the 
monetary payoff structure was symmetrical and both 
errors had the same costs. 
While the asymmetry in participants’ uncertainty 
tolerance is pronounced, the understanding of its causes 
thus far is not. Considering the experimental setting of 
the study there might be two possible explanations: the 
palpable risk of the cover story as well as the alarm 
context. In their instructions Gérard and Manzey 
presented the test environment (a multi task PC-
Simulation) as part of a control room of a chemical 
plant, where participants had to monitor reaction 
chambers. Consequently one might argue that the 
asymmetric uncertainty reduction is a somewhat 
reasonable strategy to compensate for severe risks 
attributed to misses committed in chemical plants (e.g. 
contamination, explosion), because no such risks would 
apply to false alarms. This raises the question whether a 
similar decision pattern would evolve in a low risk 
environment. 
Apart from the cover story the alarm wording could 
also play a crucial role. Participants had to monitor a 
detection aid which was presented as “alarm system”. 
Alarms usually indicate potentially dangerous events. It 
might therefore be reasonable for users of such systems 
to assume that it is more dangerous to miss a critical 
event behind an alarm than to erroneously act on a false 
alarm. Hence, the monetary payoff which was equal for 
both, misses and false alarms, might have been 
blanketed by the combination of high risk environment 
and alarm context.  
However, the asymmetry in uncertainty tolerance 
could also be a more basic issue of decision automation 
in general. In contrast to the famous omission bias in 
economics, where people refrain from taking an action, 
the asymmetry might point to a general commission bias 
in the interaction with decision aids. The mechanisms of 
which could be quite similar to what has been referred to 
as action bias in other decision making contexts (e.g. 
Bar-Eli, Azar, Ritov, Keidar-Levin, & Schein, 2007). 
That is, people might feel that they are expected to 
actively comply with recommendations by an 
automation, and that even making a false decision by 
complying with a system would be more tolerable than 
committing an error by ignoring the automated device. 
After all, users might feel more accountable for errors 
committed against a system’s advice, because 
responsibility for errors committed in accordance with 
the system advice could be considered a shared 
responsibility and thus feel reduced. As a consequence, 
uncertainty tolerance should be higher for compliance 
with cues than for objection to cues. In this case the 
results found in the alarm research referred to above 
would reflect a sort of general commission bias in 
interaction with decision support systems instead of a 
specific effect in responses to alarms in high risk 
contexts. 
The current study was conducted in order to explore 
whether the asymmetry reported by Gérard and Manzey 
(2010) also emerges in a context where 1) the perceived 
risk is much lower and 2) a neutral framing is used for 
the automated decision support system. For this purpose 
the test environment of Gérard and Manzey (2010) was 
reused, but with a different framing. The “monitoring of 
reactions in a chemical plant” became the “monitoring of 
the labeling process in a brewery” and the “alarm 
system” was now described as an “assistant system”. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
A sample of 42 students participated in the 
experiment. The data of four participants had to be 
excluded from the analysis, twice due to technical 
problems during the experiments and twice due to 
problems with the comprehension of the experimental 
task. Hence, the data of 38 participants (20 male, 18 
female, age: 19-35 years) was included in the analysis. 
Participation was compensated by 7 Euro (about 
9.50 US$) plus a performance-based bonus of up to 
15 Euro (about 20 US$). 
 
Apparatus and Tasks 
 
The same laboratory multi-task environment M-TOPS 
(Multi-Task Operator Performance Simulation) as in the 
study of Gérard and Manzey (2010) was used for the 
investigation. In this task, participants have to work on 
either two or three tasks concurrently, one of which is 
representing a monitoring task that is supported by an 
alarm system. The tasks were developed to simulate 
basic work demands of control room operators. 
However, for the present experiment the cover story 
around this task was modified to provide participants a 
different framing of the context and the automated 
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system they work with. Instead of the usual chemical 
plant cover story participants were now instructed to 
operate in the control room of a brewery. Furthermore 
the alarm system was now introduced as an assistant 
system helping in classifying the brew. 
The user-interface is shown in figure 1. It was 
exactly the same for both studies apart from some minor 
changes in terms of technical wording and the corporate 
logo. Furthermore also the logic and procedures of the 
tasks were similar to the tasks presented in Gérard's and 
Manzey's study. 
Resource Ordering Task (ROT). This task was 
situated in the upper left quadrant of the interface. 
Basically it represented a mental arithmetic task. 
Participants were instructed that they always have to 
assure the availability of a specific amount of required 
ingredients to keep the brewing process running. For this 
purpose the actual and the overall required amount of an 
ascertained ingredient were given. Participants then had 
to calculate the difference, type the result in the 
designated ordering field, and send the order by clicking 
the respective button below. This would irreversibly 
finish the ordering process. Participants had 15 seconds 
to respond to a given request. After 15 seconds a new 
request appeared, irrespective of the status of the 
preceding one. However, participants could speed up the 
sequence by actively initiating a new trial via mouse-
click on the “arrow” button (upper right). Each correct 
order was worth a bonus of 0.06 Euro. There was no 
penalty for incorrect or missed orders. 
Coolant Exchange Task. This task, presented in the 
top-right quarter, was not part of the current study and 
could be ignored by the participants. This is analogous to 
the configuration of Gérard and Manzey (2010). 
Monitoring Task (MT). This task was displayed on 
the lower-right quadrant. Here participants had to 
monitor the value of the wort concentration as this 
determines the type of beer brewed – e.g. in terms of 
taxation – and therefore the labeling needed. Above a 
certain value labeling needed to be changed from the 
default Vollbier to Starkbier (unfortunately these rather 
technical terms for two different categories of beer have 
no English translation). Brewing tanks were presented in 
a serial manner and automatically analyzed by an 
automation which in this case was called an assistant 
system. Participants were instructed that the system 
would inform about whether the wort concentration 
detected from the system was below (no labeling 
changes needed) or above a certain threshold (labeling 
changes necessary). The assignment of a tank to the 
Starkbier labeling line needed to be done manually by 
clicking on the respective button on the lower left. 
Participants had the possibility to inspect the raw data 
(i.e. the actual wort concentration) directly, thereby 
reducing uncertainty upon a given system cue to zero. 
However, the double-checking procedure was somewhat 
tedious and time consuming. First the denomination of 
the corresponding brewing tank had to be selected in a 
drop down list of quite similar tank denominations and 
afterwards wort concentration had to be determined by 
counting red areas in a pop up picture. Participants had a 
time window of 10 seconds for each presented tank in 
which they had to decide whether to directly comply 
with the automation, ignore it or first double-check the 
raw data. The system would proceed to the next brewing 
tank after this time window had elapsed or after the 
participant had entered a decision. For each correctly 
labeled tank 0.08 Euros were added to the bonus, for 
each incorrectly labeled tank 0.08 Euros were subtracted. 
That means a bonus was added or subtracted for every 
trial, even if there was no input from the participant. 
 
Design 
 
The study comprises a one factorial design. The 
factor represents two different levels of PPV 
manipulated between subjects, with one group being 
supported by a PPV=.1 system and the other by a 
PPV=.9 system. 
  
Dependent variables 
 
Behavioral measures for both tasks were derived 
from log-files which contain the complete input of each 
participant.  
As this study investigates the reaction towards alarm 
type of cues it has to be noted, that the Starkbier cue 
corresponds to the alarm cue in signal detection terms. 
Analysis will thus focus on the reaction to Starkbier 
cues. It was assessed to what percentage such cues were 
Coolant Exchange  
Resource Ordering 
Monitoring 
Figure 1. User interface of M-TOPS. 
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ignored (ignore ratio), double-checked (double-check 
ratio) or directly followed (comply ratio). Any activity 
directed towards the analysis of relevant system data was 
tagged as double-checking behavior. Note that therefore 
“ignore”, “double-check” and “comply” mark the 
complete scope of possible reactions towards a cue. 
Performance in the ROT was assessed by the number 
of correct orders. Furthermore subjective measures were 
collected for manipulation check purposes. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were welcomed and randomly assigned 
to one of four computer work stations. They were 
informed about the experiment system, the tasks and the 
payoff structure by instructions presented on the screen. 
This way they were all confronted with the same 
brewery cover story and neutral assistant system framing 
in a standardized manner. They performed a 120s 
training block with the ROT, a short 180s training block 
with the MT for comprehension of the general 
functionality and again a 100 tank MT training block for 
getting to know the reliability of the system cues. Then 
they answered a questionnaire where they were first 
asked and afterwards informed about the performance 
contribution of their assistant system. Subsequently 
participants performed the 800s experimental block 
working on both tasks at the same time. After answering 
a final questionnaire participants where paid and thanked 
for their participation. An experimental session took 
between 1.5 and 2 hours. 
  
RESULTS 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
In accordance with the manipulation of the PPV 
between groups it was ascertained, whether the different 
PPVs were reflected in participants’ perception of the 
assistant system. Perceived PPVs were calculated with 
the help of participants’ estimated quantity of Hits and 
False Alarms. As expected, participants in the PPV=.1 
condition perceived their system’s PPV to be 
significantly lower (M = .22, SD = .17) than participants 
in the PPV=.9 condition (M = .75, SD = .15), 
t(36) = -10.04, p < .001. Furthermore it was ascertained, 
that the equal amount of uncertainty generated by the 
two antipodal PPVs was reflected in participants’ 
perception of the respective uncertainty. Uncertainty was 
calculated with the help of perceived PPVs, and was 
overestimated in the PPV=.1 (M = .19, SD = .10) as well 
as in the PPV=.9 condition (M = .23, SD = .12). 
Consistent with the manipulation groups did not differ in 
the subjective amount of uncertainty caused by the two 
differently reliable Starkbier cues, t(36) = -.96, p > .20. 
The brewery cover story was intended to be 
comparatively neutral in terms of risk perception. 
Comparing a brewery (M = 2.76, SD = 1.08) to a 
chemical plant (M = 5.32, SD = .66) on a six point scale 
participants indeed reported to attribute significantly 
greater risks to the latter, t(37) = -13.90, p < .001. 
The “assistant system” framing was intended to 
eradicate the alarm context from the M-TOPS paradigm. 
Indeed only two out of 38 participants reported their 
system to be an alarm system. 
 
Behavioral Measures 
 
Monitoring task. The different responses to the 
Starkbier cues are shown on the left of figure 2. As 
expected, the most frequent response in the PPV=.9 
condition was the direct compliance with the cue 
(M = 62.7%, SD = 30.8%). In this condition only every 
third cue was double-checked by participants 
(M = 32.2%, SD = 31.2%). In accordance with the high 
PPV almost no cues were ignored (M = 5.1%, 
SD = 5.5%). As predicted a different pattern emerged in 
the PPV=.1 condition. About one fifth of the Starkbier 
cues were ignored (M = 18.9%, SD = 29.1%) and 
virtually none directly followed (M = 0.2%, SD = 0.7%). 
However, in this case double-checking was by far the 
most frequent behavior (M = 80.1%, SD = 29.0%). 
Interestingly this pattern almost replicates the results of 
Gérard and Manzey (2010) which are depicted on the 
right of figure 2. In order to analyze the statistical 
significance of the asymmetry in double-checking 
behavior both groups were compared with a t-test. In 
accordance with the hypothesis participants who were 
Figure 2. Means and standard errors for the response rates to 
system cues indicating a Signal, depending on PPV. Left: Low 
risk cover story and neutral system framing in the current 
experiment. Right: high risk cover story and alarm system 
framing in the former study. 
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supported by the PPV=.1 system double-checked 
significantly more Starkbier cues than participants 
working with PPV=.9 system, t(36) = 4.99, p < .001. 
Ordering task. Participants in the PPV=.1 condition 
in average sent 69.0 correct orders (SD = 16.3) 
compared to 60.5 correct orders (SD = 18.7) sent by 
participants in the PPV=.9 condition, t(36) = 1.48, 
p = .15. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study investigated the phenomenon of 
asymmetric human tolerance of uncertainty in the 
interaction with alarm systems. Specifically, users do 
rarely accept a small amount of uncertainty when it is 
very likely that the alarm is false (low PPV), but they do 
accept a similar amount of uncertainty when it is very 
likely that the alarm is correct (high PPV). That means 
in the former case users do double-check the raw data 
behind an alarm, in the latter case they mostly abstain 
from doing so, as reported by Gérard and Manzey 
(2010). A potential explanation was that the high risk 
environment – Gérard and Manzey presented a chemical 
plant cover story – renders subjective costs of misses 
higher than costs of false alarms, thereby causing the 
asymmetry. Another explanation was that the alarm 
context already causes asymmetry. By attribution the 
word alarm might point to a critical state which is 
comparatively dangerous or costly to be missed. 
It was however assumed that the asymmetry 
phenomenon would rather represent a basic phenomenon 
in the context of automated decision support, 
irrespective of risk attributed to cover story or alarm 
wording. To test this hypothesis, participants of the 
current study were presented a neutral cover story and 
neutral system framing for the same task as in Gérard’s 
and Manzey’s study. 
As expected, participants in the PPV=.1 group 
exhibited a significantly lower uncertainty tolerance than 
participants of the PPV=.9 group. Even more 
interestingly there were almost no differences to the 
behavioral patterns reported by Gérard and Manzey 
(2010). This strongly indicates that the asymmetry in 
uncertainty tolerance is a general problem in the 
interaction with decision support systems. Although a lot 
remains to be learned about the causal mechanisms of 
the phenomenon, the results might point to a general 
commission bias in the decision support domain. In 
accordance with findings about diffusion of 
responsibility (Milgram, 1963; Latané, & Darley, 1968) 
there might be a tendency to be less diligent when 
responsibility is shared, in this case shared with the 
system. Hence there might be a stronger reluctance to 
accept uncertainty when the responsibility for the 
decision cannot be shared. While in both cases, the 
PPV=.1 case as well as the PPV=.9 case, uncertainty is 
similar, subjective responsibility in case of an error 
might not be so. In both cases one would commit an 
error in 10% of the decisions by accepting the 
uncertainty and making a decision without checking the 
raw data. However, in the PPV=.9 case the decision 
would be in accordance with the system, i.e. 
responsibility for errors is shared. In contrast, in the 
PPV=.1 case the decision would be against the system, 
i.e. responsibility for errors is not shared. 
Further research should therefore investigate the role 
of subjective responsibility for errors in the decision 
support context. A better understanding of the 
psychology behind biases such as the asymmetry in 
uncertainty tolerance will be crucial for a more 
comprehensive design not only of alarm systems but of 
decision support systems in general. 
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